Knowledge of God
by Reason and Revelation – A Fitting Relationship
There
are few theologians who, through the corpus of their written work, not only
challenged their contemporaries, but who continue to be read and discussed in
the generations following their own life.
Even rarer are those theologians who are read, taught, commented on and
re-examined in every generation of theologians since they lived. Thomas Aquinas is one of these rare individuals. Thomas’ work of course, is even more amazing
when you consider that he stopped writing at what many consider the height of
his theological career; not even finishing his ‘magnum opus’, the Summa Theologiae. Regardless of which stream of Christianity
informs you as a theologian, or your stance on what Thomas taught, every
theologian must interact with what he wrote 800 years ago.
As
a Protestant in the Evangelical Reformed tradition, I find Thomas’ discussion
of the relationship between the knowledge of God that is known by reason alone
and the knowledge that comes through faith to be particularly challenging. It is this discussion that I would like to
explore in this essay. How does Thomas
bring these two together in a way that does justice to both without excluding
or encapsulating one into the other? I
will primarily focus on the Prima Pars, questions 1, 2, 12 and 13. Finally, I will briefly look at Thomas’ view
of the role of the Incarnation in the knowledge of God as discussed in the Tertia
Pars, question 1.
When
dealing with the topic of the knowledge of God, one of the biggest problems
that the theologian encounters is the relationship between human reason and
divine revelation in what can and cannot be known about God through reason
unaided by revelation. Theologians have dealt
with this relationship in different ways.
Some have pushed back at divine revelation and said that theology is
really just a task of the human mind reaching out to know who and what God is
like. Others have pushed back at human
reason and said that knowledge of God must be just the task of the divine
reaching down and giving the human mind the knowledge. Thomas, as a student in the church and as
learned scholar of philosophy, wants us to hold onto both. He says that there is truth about God that can
be achieved by human reason, but there are limitations. Aquinas says, “For the truth about God, such
as reason can know it, would only be known by a few, and that after a long
time, and with the admixture of errors” (ST I.Q1.A1). There is clearly truth about God that can be
known through the created world. In
discussing the demonstratable existence of God, Thomas quotes Romans 1:20,
stating that “if the existence of God were demonstrated, this could only be
from His effects” (ST I.Q2.A2).
What
then is the purpose of God giving revelation?
Thomas is clearly not going to diminish the need or value of the
revelation of God in the Scriptures.
Thomas reminds us that part of the issue is that sacred doctrine is not
of the same “genus” (ST I.Q1.A1.RO2) as philosophical reasoning. They are related, but not the same. Both therefore are necessary for the full
knowledge of God. Without revelation,
the most important things about God and his work – the doctrine of salvation
for one – would not be known, but this knowledge is required for humans to
achieve their true end (finem). So, “it was necessary that, besides the
philosophical disciplines investigated by reason, there should be a sacred
doctrine by way of revelation” (ST I.Q1.A1).
This necessity should be understood as a concept that Thomas will bring
to many of his discussions of necessity, fitingness (ST I.Q1.A1). It is fitting (pointing to end or purpose)
that to accomplish this end, God would give the sacred doctrine through
revelation.
Perhaps,
the opposite is true. Perhaps we only
need the sacred doctrines that come through revelation. Thomas reminds us that sacred doctrine makes
use of philosophical reasoning, “not as though it stood in need of them, but
only in order to make its teaching clearer” (ST I.Q1.A5.RO2). The ‘Queen of Sciences’ does not need
philosophy to be known, but in the “lifting up” of the person to know God (ST
I.Q12.A5) we as knowers need this use of the lesser sciences. We as lesser creatures, need these
‘scaffolds’ (a term that is used in educational settings to describe teacher
helps in the beginning of the learning process) to move us from material things
to sacred doctrines (ST I.Q1.A9). This
is one of the reasons that Scripture sometimes presents sacred doctrine in
metaphorical ways. This is not a
diminishment of the full truth of sacred doctrine, but a veiling (a concept
introduced by Dionynius) so that all men, not just the few highly intellectual,
can know these sacred truths (ST I.Q1.A9).
It is because of our limited capacity that the divine nature is
communicated through likenesses, figures, metaphors and analogies. It is fitting that God should communicate
himself, but this communication must be given in a way that we as knowers can
comprehend. As a Protestant, this truth
needs to be remembered in our understanding of the doctrine of sola
scriptura. While we must stay deeply
committed to Scripture as the foundation of our faith, we must remember that in
Scripture God is making a fitting accommodation to us as knowers. We do not come know Scripture independently
of ourselves and our culture. God spoke
through cultures and individuals because without this accommodation, no
knowledge would be possible. Yes sin has
noetic effects, but that is also part of the accommodation that God makes. We are not bound to culture to know – sacred
doctrine speaks to us still, even in our modern culture – but God does lift us
up to know him through these metaphors, analogies, likenesses and figures.
One
of the reasons that sacred doctrine makes use of the lesser sciences is to
demonstrate its truth. These
demonstrations are not proofs of the sacred doctrines, but are arguments
against those who object to the sacred doctrines. Thomas says, “Hence Sacred Scripture, since
it has not science above itself, disputes argumentatively with one who denies
it principles…” (ST I.Q1.A8). The
reason, “we can argue with heretics from texts in Holy Scripture, and against
those who deny one article of faith we can argue from another” (ST
I.Q1.A8). The use of lesser sciences has
a purpose then beyond just our knowing, it has an apologetic or evangelistic
purpose.
This
of course leads to the discussion of the proofs of the existence of God. There has perhaps been no more contested
subject that discusses the relationship between faith and reason than that of
the proofs for the existence of God.
Thomas will take up the subject in Article 3 in Question 2, but before
he does that, he discusses whether the existence of God is self-evident. While there are certainly many in the
Christian community who would argue that God’s existence is self-evident,
Thomas says that in the most important way, God’s existence is not
self-evident, because it is not evident to all.
This is “because we do not know the essence of God,” so the existence of
God needs to be demonstrated by the things that are known to us, his effects
(ST I.Q2.A1). Following Augustine,
Aquinas does acknowledge that there is a sense of the existence of God that is
known to everyone, but that is not known absolutely (ST I.Q2.A1.RO1). This non-absolute knowing is based on human
happiness, perhaps an echo left from the nature of man before the fall. But to fulfill this happiness, man turns to
things that will not satisfy – pleasures, riches, etc.
Thomas
gives his proofs for the existence of God in Article 3 of Question 2, which
have come to be known as the Five Ways. Theologians
and philosophers of every generation have been discussing the validity and
success of the Five Ways virtually since Thomas penned the Summa. The fourth
way (what is today called the Moral Argument) and the fifth way (the Teliological
Argument) are particular popular today and are used by apologists very
effectively in the discussions regarding the new atheism. Regardless of whether these Five Ways are
actually successful at proving the existence of God or more specifically the
God of revelation, we get the picture that Thomas is not going to leave
anything out this discussion. One way is
easy to counter-argue, two is better, but the totality of consideration of the
Five Ways is something that Thomas wants to leave his readers with the
impression of the completeness. By
listing all five, there is little left for consideration. It is interesting that the area which has
occupied most of the thinking of atheism in the 20th Century – the
problem of evil – is only dealt with in single line (ST I.Q2.A3.RO1). The task of theology to speak to every
generation is evident, even in so great a theologian as Thomas.
Knowing
that God exists is not the end of the discussion for Thomas. He also spends a significant amount of time
on the issues of how God is known by us (Q 12) and how we can properly name God
(Q 13). In knowing and naming God, the
relationship between nature and grace, faith and reason, is again at the center
of Thomas’ thinking. Since God is known
to us through the creation (Romans 1:20), this relationship will be very
important in Thomas’ development of these two subjects. There is much in these two questions that we
will not be able to unpack, but by limiting our focus on this relationship, we
will be able to get the essence of what Thomas is trying to tell us about
knowing and naming God.
For
Thomas, since God is pure act – with no potentiality – God is supremely
knowable, even to his very essence (ST I.Q12.A1). “But what is supremely knowable in itself may
not be knowable to a particular intellect, because of the excess of the
intelligible object above the intellect” (ST I.Q12.A1). God is supremely knowable, but we do not know
him supremely. This is a very important
concept in the fleshing out of the relationship between nature and grace; between
faith and reason. We know God through
the mediation of his effects in creation, but we must remember that does not
mean that we know God in the same way that he knows us. The analogy that he gives is the sun. The sun is supremely visible (there is no
absence of light) but we cannot apprehend it completely because it is too
bright. We know God, but we must
remember that God is beyond our ability to know completely.
Perhaps God is so
far beyond our ability to know him, that we really do not know him. Maybe we are looking at a candle thinking it
is the sun. Aquinas says no, we really
can – in a limited way – know the essence of God. His reason is beauty – the attainment of the
beauty that comes from the highest function of man – his intellect (ST
I.Q12.A1). Through the beauty of the
intellect, the highest beauty must be able to be known – again focusing on the
concept of fittingness. The intellect
was made for knowing, what is the most fitting thing to know, the one who
created the intellect. “But if the
intellect of the rational creature could not attain to the first cause of
things, the natural desire would remain vain (inane)” (ST I.Q12.A1).
But
we must square this with what we know about mankind. Rarely does mankind achieve this level of
knowledge, by Thomas’ own admission (cf. Q1).
There is a sense in which nature fails us, which is why revelation is
necessary. In articles 4 and 5 of
question 12, Thomas explores this relationship between nature and grace. To attain the knowledge of the essence of
God, not only must God come down through accommodation by uniting his essence
in grace to the ‘created intellect’ (ST I.Q12.A4), but he also lifts us up by
adding a ‘supernatural disposition’ to the intellect (ST I.Q12.A5). In this supernatural act of God, both in
coming down and in raising us up, we are made to be more than we are by nature;
we are made ‘deiform’ - like to God (ST I.Q12.A5). This “light of glory cannot be natural to a
creature unless the creature were to have a divine nature; which is impossible”
(ST I.Q12.A5.RO3). This divine light is
given by God as an act of supernatural grace, allowing the non-divine creature
to know the essence (at least in some way) of the Creator. In this act of “beatific” illumination (not
Thomas’ wording), we are reminded that to be what God intends us to be, we need
grace. We need revelation, for without
it, what we are to be, cannot be. And
even with this act of accommodation and lifting us up to know the essence of
God in the divine light, we still must recognize that we are limited in what of
God’s essence we do know. “No created
intellect can attain to that perfect mode of the knowledge of the divine
intellect…” (ST I.Q12.A7). We still will
only know in proportion. Though not used
by Thomas, perhaps we could call to mind the vision of God that Moses had. Though he only saw the trailing edge of God’s
glory because it was too much for Moses to see all of God, it was still enough
to require that he be veiled because residual effects. This knowledge of God that we will receive in
the light of glory still does not result in full comprehension, because God
will always be more than we can comprehend.
In
the discussion of naming God, we always struggle with the concept of language
and subject/object. While there is
insufficient space to deal entirely with this discussion, if we again focus on
the relationship between faith and reason, we will get a good picture of what
Thomas is trying to tell us about this important issue. The main means that Thomas uses to talk about
the naming of God is analogy. He creates
this because we have problems with both univocity and equivocity in the naming
of God. God is not good in the same way
that we predicate the word in our normal usage – my children were good today
for instance. They are not univocal,
because they are not proportional (ST I.Q13.A5). But neither are they entire equivocal. I cannot say that there is no relationship
between good as I use it and good as it is applied to God; otherwise, there
could be nothing that we do know of God (ST I.Q13.A5). With one sentence, and a short one at that,
Thomas gives us the path between the two, “For we can name God only from
creatures” (ST I.Q13.A5). With this one
statement, a path between univocity and equivocity is made by the creation of
analogies between creature and Creator.
There is a relationship between ‘good’ as it is applied to both God and
to creatures. Thomas calls this the
‘mean’ between what we do/can know and what we do not/cannot know. It is the way to that we can bridge the
natural to arrive at the supernatural.
It is a via of grace, by use of nature.
This
bridge between is of course best pictured in the Incarnation itself The supernatural act of accommodation and the
supernatural act of lifting up are brought together in God taking on our
nature. In order to lift us up, God came
down. The immortal took on mortality. Again, Thomas uses the concept of fittingness
to describe the incarnation. “It belongs
to the essence of the highest good to communicate itself in the highest manner
to the creature, and this is brought about chiefly by” God joining the
creaturely nature to Himself (ST. III.Q1.A1).
In the relationship between natural knowledge and revelation, the
ultimate act of that allows knowledge of God is the incarnation. It is the ultimate act of revelation, and it
is fitting and beautiful. A perfection
reflection of God himself.
Bibliography
Aquinas,
St. Thomas. The Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Vol. 1. Ed. By Anton C. Pegis. Random House, New York. 1945.
________. The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas
Aquinas. Second and Revised Edition, 1920. Literally translated by Fathers
of the English Dominican Province. Online Edition Copyright © 2008 by Kevin
Knight. http://www.newadvent.org/summa/4001.htm. [Access 11/2/11].