Tuesday, December 6, 2011

Augustine on Language and Knowledge


AUGUSTINE ON LANGUAGE AND KNOWLEDGE
            One of the current struggles that is facing the world of the humanities in general and philosophy and theology in particular is the crisis of epistemological foundations.  In a post-modern, post-foundational, post-Christian, post-everything world, the quest for truth and knowledge is facing a new critique.  This is new only in a very limited sense, because it is in many ways very similar some very old critiques of the foundation of knowledge.  The search for the basis of truth and knowledge has fluctuated between the Platonic world of the Forms, the Aristotelian emphasis on empirical observation and the Skeptics who essentially gave up on the search of a basis for knowledge and truth.  The history of philosophy records this pendulum swing back and forth, sometimes pointing solidly toward one of the views and sometimes in between which creates confusion in the world of knowledge and truth.
            The current pendulum swing leaves us in just such a place, depending on who you read and how you interpret what they are saying.  Many who would call themselves postmodern are in the skeptical camp with their rejection of an ultimate basis for truth.  Such a foundation is a myth, part of a narrative that has been constructed by various groups and social structures.  But each of these groups or ideas for a foundation has ultimately been rejected.  There is no God/gods on whom we can rest truth statements.  The Church has long since been rejected as well in an enlightened world of science.  Now in a post-modern world, reason as the unshakeable foundation for ultimate truth (the sciences) has faced the same rejection.  There is no foundation, everyone is bound in a story that is bound in language; language is bound by culture and culture is always changing.  So, in our postmodern world of non-foundationalism, language itself is an impediment to knowledge.
            With this epistemological morass as a backdrop, it was refreshing to read the 4th/5th century Church father, Augustine, who addressed the issue of language and knowledge, with particular emphasis on the knowledge of God in revelation and reason.  If language is only a socially agreed upon construct, can we use it to gain any knowledge; especially knowledge of God.  Current Postmodern thinkers would say no, but Augustine clearly says yes.  In this essay, I would like to explore a little of Augustine’s view of language and its relationship and use in knowing, especially as he applies it to the knowledge of God.  We will explore these areas in three of Augustine’s works: On the Trinity (DT), On Christian Teaching (DDC) and Against the Academicians (CA). 
            While Augustine’s view of language is not a fully-developed, systemized study, we can gain some understanding of his subject through his discussions of signs, analogies, metaphors and predication.  In the greatest sense of communication, Augustine recognizes that humans can and do use a multitude of different methods and means, besides what we would typically think of as language.  People can communicate through what Augustine calls physical signs.  These can be a nod, a look or a hand-gesture.  These are understood to be signs when we do them to another person with the intent of making them aware of our wishes (DDG; B2, Para 5). 
            However, the great majority of communication is through words, both spoken and written.  Even with words, the majority of the words that we use are in the written form, because of the limitations of spoken words.  Augustine says, “But spoken words cease to exist as soon as they come into contact with the air, and their existence is not more lasting than that of their sound; hence the invention, in the form of letters, of signs of words” (DDG; B2, Para 8).  He repeats this idea – adding the notion of invention of letters - in On the Trinity, “But where as we exhibit these and the like bodily signs either to ears or eyes of persons present to whom we speak, letters have been invented that we might be able to converse also with the absent…” (DT; B15,Chpt. 10. Para 19). 
            Language (or at least letters), therefore, is in invention of man for the purpose of communicating via signs of letters and construction of words.  In a postmodern understanding of language, this becomes very important.  Since language is an invention of humans, it has to be culturally conditioned, because humans are intrinsically cultural beings.  We live in it and it infuses us, and we often are not even aware of it, much like a fish is not aware of the water that encompasses its life.  Our own cultural constructions become more obvious to us when we are confronted by someone who does not come from our culture.  This can be someone from our own country, such as a farm kid moving to the big city, or someone from another country altogether.  This cultural conditioning or situatedness of language creates barriers to understanding.  How can I come to understand truth through language if it not based on real objective reality?  This is the postmodern’s dilemma. 
            This problem is further complicated by the fact that our thinking itself is bound to language.  Augustine understands this well, when he talks about thoughts as being “speeches of the heart.”  “For although there were no words spoken, at any rate, he who thinks speaks in his heart” (DT, B. XV. Chpt. 10, Para. 17).   He understands this both from personal experience with his own thinking as well as from Scripture.  Jesus knew the thoughts of the Pharisees’ hearts, even though they did not say anything out loud.  He says the same idea in other place, “for the thought that is founded by the thing which we know, is the word which we speak in the heart…” (DT, B XV, Chpt. 10, Para. 19). 
            This does not mean that language can mean anything that you want it to.  It would be easy to fall into this trap, but when Augustine is discussing the Trinity, he is very careful to avoid this problem.  In his discussion on the adding a particular kind of negation to a particular statement (unbegotten vs. nonbegotten) does not change the essence of what you are saying about the substance of the thing that you are discussing.  “Wherefore, in speaking of this thing or that, we must not consider what the usage of our language either allows or does not allow, but what clearly appears to be the meaning of the things themselves” (DT, Bk V, Chpt 7, Para 8).  The particulars of a given language grammatical structure is not the issue as much as what are the real implications of what is trying to be said. 
            Language, constructed as it is (or may be), is the vehicle that we have at our disposal to speak about God.  It may seem that this vehicle is insufficient for that purpose, and indeed many in the church have stated as much, but it is in the connection between language as a signifier of ideas that Augustine brings to his discussion on both the doctrine of the Trinity and the understanding of Scripture.  It is clear that Augustine makes a strong connection between sign, signifier and language as a vehicle for the real communication of truth.  It is not perfect, but it is effective because the only reason that you use words and language is actually to communicate intended meaning (the great irony of the hard postmodern thinkers is that they write books while denying connected meaning to text).  Augustine in his treatise On Christian Teaching says, “All teaching is teaching of either things or signs, but things are learnt through signs.” (Bk 1, Para 4).  This becomes the main model that Augustine will use to teach in both On the Trinity and On Christian Teaching.  He says that whole reason that we use words is to signify something, “Words, for example: nobody uses words except in order to signify something.  From this it may be understood what I mean by signs: those things which are employed to signify something” (DDC, Bk 1, Para 5).  Let us consider briefly how Augustine applies the concept of sign to both his study of the Trinity and his study of Scripture. 
            In his discussion of the Trinity, Augustine recognizes that there is a problem with the use of words to describe the Trinity.  If language is part of our cultural heritage, and is even part of our thought processes, how do we use language to speak of God?  The problem is that God is above the mind in the first place, how do we speak about that we which we cannot form a thought.  Because we are bound to an extent to the limitations of language, our culture and our minds, can we really form an idea about God?  Augustine discusses this as the seeking of something which we can never gain.  Will we only ever seek but never find truth about God, and the Trinity?  This is the struggle of faith and understanding – “Faith seeks, understanding finds…” Augustine says.  While we will never completely understand, that should not prevent the search, because we are told by Paul that the “invisible things of Him…are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.”  This gives Augustine (and all Christians) the opportunity seek knowledge in our world, including the world of language, even while we recognize the limitations.  Part of Augustine’s solution to this is to make a distinction between knowledge and the thought of knowledge.  The problem then lies in the use of language about that knowledge, not in the knowledge itself.  He illustrates this in the following way,
“For the same reason neither do we say three greats (for each member of the Trinity), but one who is great; since God is not great by partaking in greatness, but He is great by Himself being great, because He Himself is His own greatness.  Let the same be said also of the goodness, and of the eternity, and of the omnipotence of God, and in short, all of the predicaments which can be predicated of God, as He spoke of in respect to Himself, not metaphorically and by similitude, but properly, if indeed anything can be spoken of Him properly, by the mouth of man” (DT, Bk V, Chapt 10.). 

The problem is the limitation of language, not in God or the potential knowledge of him.  We might be tempted to think that the words that we use are only metaphors, but Augustine wants to remind us that, though limited, the language that we use of God is in some way a real descriptor of God and his character.  It does matter what words we use to describe God.  We will always have problems with our language in describing God, think about how we describe the eternal God acting in time, but that does not mean the task should be abandoned. 
            This also becomes a problem when we come to the Scriptures and how we should understand them.  Augustine reminds us in On Christian Teaching that language is not universally hegemoneous, so the signs of language cannot be shared among people of different language groups until this barrier is overcome (DDG, Bk 2, para 8).  This applies to Scripture as well, “…even divine scripture, by which assistance is provided for the many serious disorders of the human will, after starting off in a single language, in which it could have been conveniently spread throughout the world, was circulated far and wide in the various languages of translators…” (DDG, Bk 2, para.9).  So the Scriptures were written in one language and cultural setting, but we speak a different language and live in a different cultural setting.  How then can the Scriptures speak to us?  An obvious answer would be translation, but that is not sufficient.  Augustine reminds his readers that there were a wide-variety and quality of translations of the Bible into Latin, so he encourages them consult many of the available translations to get a proper understanding of the text.  It is also important to Augustine that the reader spend time learning some of the meanings of the signs of Scripture that might be lost due to difference of culture.  He gives the example of this with the word bovum or ox.  We have an idea of what this word signifies.  However, Scripture also uses this sign in another way, as a worker of the Gospel (Deut 25:4, I Cor 9:9, 1 Tim 5:8).  We can work at overcoming this language barrier with study of the original languages and culture. 
            Augustine talks about the fact that there is an understanding of Scripture that at first appears “hidden” to a normal reading of language.  Again, this might seem a barrier to knowledge, but it falls to us as readers of Scripture to understand these analogies, by seeking the meaning of the sign as it was originally intended.  Animals, plants, stones, numbers, and other things can all have a second significance that needs to be understood and explored if the reader is to understand the language of Scripture.  These are all potential language barriers to knowledge, but they are only potential, not final barriers.   The reader must begin not with language understanding, but proper heart/soul orientation.  “It is therefore necessary above all else to be moved by the fear of God towards learning his will:  what is that he instructs us to seek or avoid” (DDG, Bk 2, Para. 16).  So the language of Scripture can and does give us knowledge, through the writers having an idea, communicating that through the signifiers of their language and culture and then we – through some work at times – see the beyond the signifier to the thing that is signified.  In this way, we know what the will of God is through Scripture.
            Finally, the question needs to be addressed to knowledge outside of revelation.  Augustine has been exploring the knowledge that we gain through revelation about the Trinity and how we can understand the revelation itself.  But perhaps, that is only because of the subject matter, or the person behind the revelation.  Perhaps we can overcome the situatedness of language in these areas because we have something extra.  Maybe outside of revelation, language prohibits us from knowing anything.  Augustine’s treatise Against the Academicians deals with the issue of skepticism and knowledge of the truth.  In it he deals with the issue of whether there is truth, and whether truth can be truly known.  He is arguing against the “Academicians” of the Third Academy who have taken the position of hard skepticism, much like postmodernity today. 
            While it is beyond the scope of our present essay to discuss Augustine’s argument, it is helpful to remember that for Augustine, language is the vehicle for knowing truth.  Does this apply to the discussion about skepticism?  The connection is not explicit in this treatise, but it is certainly the backdrop behind his argument.  He spends time in both Books 1 and 2 defining and reaching conclusions about understanding of words. This makes sense in an environment where knowledge comes through agreed upon understanding.  To have knowledge in language, there must be similar images or signs that the words point to (Cf, the bovum illustration).  He says, “Someone who gazes upon an exemplar does, indeed, rightly approve an image of it.  How then does the wise man give his approval to nothing, or follow the truthlike, if he doesn’t know what the truth itself is?” (CA, 3.18.40.7).  This is more clearly seen in the use of words in dialectical reasoning, “Dialectic has also taught me that there shouldn’t be any dispute over words when there is agreement on the matter for the sake of which the words are spoken” (CA 3.13.29.23).  The Academicians were using language to constantly change the agreed upon understanding of words, which Augustine calls “making a fuss about a name.”  The end of the argument for Augustine is that you cannot say that you cannot have the truth unless you know the truth.  If you know the truth, you have defeated your own argument.  The language games that the Academicians were playing (eg., seems vs. is) were just that, games. 
For Augustine, truth is known through language, even truth outside of revelation.  Language is not a constructed barrier, but rather it is a vehicle to getting at the truth.  It is humanly constructed, and culturally situated, but adequate nonetheless. 





Biblography
Saint Augustine.  On Christian Teaching.  Translated by RPH Green.  Oxford, England:  Oxford University Press, 1997.

_______.  Against the Academicians. Translated by Peter Kind. Indianapolis, IN: Hacket Publishing Company, 1995.

_______.  On the Trinity. In Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 3.  Edited by Philip Schaff. Translated by Arthur West Hadden. Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.  Revised and Edited for the New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/130105.htm>
            

No comments:

Post a Comment